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The possibility of developing a 'suite' of critical engineering parts to be carried by
one of a group of Gas-turbine ships when deployed together has been raised. Such
ships are sufficiently uniform in their engineering plants to make such a 'suite' feasible.
The end purpose would be to lessen the possibility of a loss of mission' engineering
failure by having low demand parts in theater. The inherent question is that of the
performance of both current allowance computation models and the operating
procedures which support those models. To answer the questions, a test of the current
COSAL model is compared with a similar test of a model more attuned to high levels
of protection. Allowance computation procedures are explored, as are those of the
related essentia^ty measuring systems. The author presents the results of this test,
conclusions drawn therefrom, suggestions for possible action and recommendations for
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I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, when a battle group deploys, it does does not carry with it all of the
major engineering parts that may be required in case of a part failure. When the
group includes a(n Aircraft) Carrier, this has not been a serious problem. The
needed part can be flown directly to the battle group on regular flights. When
there is no carrier, however, there are longer delays and substantially greater
costs involved in delivering such parts. Thus, the Navy would like to study the
feasibility and the cost effectiveness of sending battle groups on deployment with
'pack-up' kits of major engineering ship parts -- as is now done for helicopters.
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this research is to determine if an alternative method can be
determined which might provide for carrying a 'suite' of parts for systems, the failure of
which might halt the mission of the vessel. By carrying a suite of spares uniformly
available to a majority of ships in company, the Engineer's desire to have his spares on
hand might better be met and transportation and supply system delays might be
lessened for the delivery of critical, yet not-carried parts. Additionally, I propose to
investigate any measureable change in effectiveness as a result of such a 'suite' of parts
being in company.
B. OPERATIONAL VERSUS SUPPLY VIEWPOINT
In any shipboard environment, the viewpoints of the Supply Officer and the
Engineering Officer may well differ with respect to which repair parts should be carried
on board. In brief, the Supply Officer is charged with providing support from one of
two sources. Either he has the part or material in stock, as provided by a Consolidated
Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL), or he must requisition the required part or
material from the Navy Supply System. The number of line items carried, (referred to,
commonly, as range), and the quantity of any individual line item carried, (referred to,
commonly, as depth), are provided by the COSAL models. These are used by Inventory
Managers at the Navy's Inventory Control Point for ship's equipment, Navy Ship's
Parts Control Center in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. With limited exceptions, the
Supply Officer has no control over range or depth of spares carried. The Engineering
Officer, on the other hand, would, if he could, demand a complete set of spares be
LCDR Joe Bouchard, L'SN, Destroyer Squadron 21, personal letter to Prof.
James VI. Fremgen
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carried in his vessel to ensure that he would never break down. His uttermost desire
would be for instantaneous service by the supply system. It is this polarity of opinions
which provides the impetus for this research. Through investigating the possibilities of
stocking parts for 'critical' systems, as defined by operating personnel, I hope to bring
the more standard, statistically developed spare parts allowances into balance with the
'gut feel' of the operational personnel. This potential suite of parts is made more
universally applicable and less 'hull-unique' through the standardization of engineering
plants among the gas-turbine ships.
C. GAS-TURBINE STANDARDIZATION
The Navy has built four classes of ships utilizing gas turbine technology. These
are the SPRUANCE class destroyers, the KIDD class guided missile destroyers, the
OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class frigates and the TICONDEROGA class guided
missile cruisers. Differing in mission, weapons configuration and supply support, the
ships closely resemble each other in their engineering suites.
Within each class, the ships were constructed to be clones of each other. Each
was built based on assembly line techniques. As such, their engineering plants are very
uniform with respect to both physical layout and the equipment installed therein. 2
COSAL allowances are virtually identical between ships.
Between classes, the uniformity carries forward with respect to equipment
installed. The PERRY class ships have engineering plants loosely approximating one-
half that of a SPRUANCE. Ancillary systems differ more than the significant major
elements of the propulsion plants. The TICONDEROGA class are built on
SPRUANCE hulls. Their engineering plants are very similar to those of the
SPRUANCE destroyers.
When a squadron of vessels is assigned a mission, it is conceivable, then, that a
majority o[ the ships within that squadron might be made up of vessels with virtually
identical propulsion plants. The propensity for duplication of supply support within
the squadron is high. It also means that fewer very low demand, yet highly essential,
parts might be required in the event of a critical engineering casualty among ships in
the squadron. This similarity of critical need provides the basis for this research, in
that one single suite of 'critical' spares would be applicable to numerous hulls.
'Information from the type-desk at SPCC indicates that future overhauls of the
gas-turbine ships will permit deviation from the current standardization within the gas-
turbine configurations.
D. PROBLEM EXPANSION
There are three additional concerns which add to the reason for exploring
alternatives to the current methodology to provide not-carried spares to deployed units.
These are Time, Transportation and Replaceability. These three elements can provide
for unnecessary degradation of effectiveness and delays in repair of any system.
From the time any system fails for want of a not-carried part, the delay can be as
much as seven days or more; even if the part is in stock at a retail stock point. Most of
this time is related to communication and delay. For the systems which are the subject
of this research, we assume that failure would cause a C-4 CASREP 3 condition, that
meaning an inability of the ship to continue its mission. Such a CASREP requires
submission of a message report and concurrent requisition for parts. These messages
are subject to the routing priorities of NWP-3. After arrival, and screening, the
requisitions are still subject to UMMIPS time standards. Without dealing in exact
details of transportation, significant delay is experienced, even in shipping a part to a
carrier-supported unit.
Transportation to a non-carrier supported unit can be a frustrating experience.
In most cases, critical parts are flown by Military Airlift Command (MAC) aircraft.
This requires diplomatic clearance of aircraft, but avoids customs problems. In the
event of the necessary use of non-military air transport, it requires State Department
intervention to clear parts through foreign customs. The delays can be measured in
days. Again, without dealing in details outside the scope of this research, it is the
writer's experience that shipment of critical parts in a foreign environment can add
significantly to the cost of, and delay in bringing a critical system back on line. 4
The replaceability issue is one worthy only of note in this research. In a C-4
situation, repair and replacement may be undertaken of parts and systems which are
deemed, by the hardware designers, not to be repairable by the ship's maintenance
personnel. Again, it is the personal experience of the writer that systems not requiring
3The Casualty Reporting System, utilized by the Navy, requires a message report,
a CASREP, for any degradation of the capability to perform it's mission. There are
three classifications:
C-2 - equipment failure with negligible mission effect
C-3 - failure with significant degradation of mission effect
C-4 - inability to continue mission
C-3 and C-4 are considered major in scope.
4
L'se of the U.S. Postal Service avoids both the diplomatic and customs
problems, but invites the delays inherent in utilizing the overseas postal system.
Additionally, visibility is lost with respect to the whereabouts of the parts.
10
special purpose tooling, (such as that required in replacement of a Gas-turbine
Generator), may be repairable. An example is the replacement, by USS CONOLLY
(DD979), of two sets of shaft bearings while deployed off the coast of Chile in 1983.
Replacement of these bearings was deemed to be a shipyard job requiring 36 hours of
pier time. Following a 10 day delay, awaiting parts, CONOLLY personnel changed
the first set in 26 hours and the second set in 18 hours.
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In pursuing an answer to the general question of "Are the parts more valuable in
theater than on the shelf?", this research will endeavor to answer the following
questions:
1. Do current COSAL allowance models provide carried status for the 'most-
likely-to-fail' critical parts?
2. If an alternate model were used would it provide greater range of critical parts?
3. Do any such parts exist in current Navy owned inventories in sufficient
numbers to support an 'in-theater' repair parts 'suite'?
4. How should visibility on such parts be maintained?
5. Are there subjective elements of the model which effect its ability to meet its
objective effectiveness goals?
F. PRESENTATION OUTLINE
I propose to present this research by using the following format within the body
of this thesis.
This chapter contains the basic introduction with respect to the purpose, problem
description and research questions.
Chapter II will present the basic methodology by which I intend to seek to
answer each of the research questions posed in section E, above.
The next Chapter will present background information required to follow the
methodology of the research. I intend to present a basic introduction to the
Consolidated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL) models used, and the basis for my
investigation into the two methods used to determine the military essentiality of the
systems and components included in the sample. With respect to the sample, my
reasons and methods for selecting the sample systems and the methodology for
selecting the parts to run through each model will also be discussed.
The results of the applications of and comparison between the models will be
presented in Chapter IV, with any conclusions drawn, therefrom, enumerated in
Chapter V.
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Chapter VI presents a summary of the conclusions as they relate to the research
questions stated above, and any recommendations made.




A. PARTITIONING THE APPROACH
The Research Questions posed in Chapter I logically divide into three separate
groups. Questions 1 and 2 follow, one from the other, in search of an answer to the
possibility of determining a 'suite' of parts not, heretofore, selected by the existing
model. Question 3 flows from a positive answer with respect to any increases in range
resulting from the application of any alternative model, with the question of available
inventory, question 4, following from there. Question 5 stands alone in questioning
methods, and necessity for maintaining visibility on these parts.
To aid the reader in following the methodology, Figure 2.1 is provided as a flow-
chart of the process used to reach conclusions and/or recommendations.
B. MODEL COMPARISION METHODOLOGY
Answers to the research questions should flow reasonably from a comparison of
COSAL allowance models. I propose to compare independent allowance computations
for a sample of five Allowance Parts Lists (APL) common to all three gas-turbine ship
classes. The two models selected are the .1 MOD-FLSIP model and the allowance
model utilized for the TRIDENT Strategic Missile Submarine. Chapter III discusses
these models in greater detail. Comparison of the models first requires determination
of Military Essentiality Codes for both systems and components. I propose to
compute these codes independently using current CASREP and demand histories.
These codes are essential elements of the allowance computations made within their
respective models. Comparison of the two independently computed sample allowance
lists will provide for conclusions to be drawn with respect to research questions 1 and
2.
Additionally, and pertinent to all conclusions drawn, should be the question of
whether there is any benefit to be gained by carrying additional range.
5The Modified Fleet Logistics Support Improvement Program model provides for




























Figure 2.1 Methodology Flowchart.
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C. SUBJECTIVE ELEMENTS IN THE STUDY
In the process of defining the method by which the research would be conducted,
the possibility of one or more subjective effects upon model performance became
evident.
• The actual effectiveness of the COSAL model is dependent upon the
completeness and accuracy of the historical demand data.
• The allowance comparisons between TRIDENT and Mod-FLSIP will be
effected by the different levels of support required for each, requiring
adjustment of one or the other.
The effect that these subjective elements had on the research is noted in Chapter
IV.
D. THE QUESTION OF INVENTORY VISIBILITY
Interviews with Squadron, Type Commander and Inventory Control Point
(SPCC) personnel will provide the basis for my commentary on the best method of
controlling any 'suite' of parts which should be selected by the model described, above.
Question 5, although totally subjective in nature, is of importance when the potential
cost, both in replacement and opportunity cost, is considered as a result of removing
one Minimum Replacement Unit (MRU) each of any parts from stock.
E. BASIC DATA SOURCES
SPCC, Mechanicsburg, PA provided the vast bulk of parts data required for this
research, including CASREP and APL data. Demand data was provided by Naval Sea
Logistics Engineering Center, Mechanicsburg.
The data required to determine the surface Item Mission Essentiality Code was
extracted from SPCC CASREP reports and computed in accordance with procedures
outlined in NAVSUP Pub 533, Inventory Management. [Ref. 1: p. 4-40]
Information with respect to component-to-system and system-to-mission
relationships required for the TRIDENT Mission Essentiality Coding was obtained
from interviews with Type Desk, Type Commander and Squadron personnel.
Demand data required for allowance computation was obtained from the Naval
Sea Logistics Engineering Center, Mechanicsburg, PA. The information was obtained
from the 3M 6 files cross-referenced by APL.
6The Maintenance Material Management (3M) system is charged with the
collection of maintenance related supply data.
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Finally, information on the allowed status of parts selected by the alternate
model was obtained from the Provisioning Allowance Parts List. This data was
obtained from the Master Index of Allowance Parts Lists provided by SPCC and Naval
Supply Center, Oakland, CA.
F. FURTHER INVESTIGATION SOURCES
Special bibliographies were assembled by the Defense Logistics Information
Exchange, Fort Lee, VA and by the Naval Postgraduate School Library. To obtain a
better understanding of the allowance models in question, significant study was
undertaken in both the Mod-FLSIP and TRIDENT allowance models, as well as their
respective Military Essentiality Coding routines.
A review of current directives with respect to stocking policy, demand and
insurance items was undertaken. Research Reports published by the Navy Fleet




A. MILITARY ESSENTIALITY CODE DETERMINATION
As early as 1958, studies were undertaken to determine the feasibility of utilizing
an effectiveness criterion based upon the relationship of parts to their equipments and,
subsequently, to the overall mission of the vessel for determining the appropriate mix
of parts to carry as spares. [Ref. 2: p. i]
Virtually all other allowance models proposed since then, and all those concerned
with this study, continue to be based, at least in part, on the mission value of a
componenent to the vessel. The two allowance models I compared were based upon
two different approaches to the question of mission criticality. The first considered is
that currently in use within the surface community, the CASREP-based Mission
Criticality Code. 7
1. CASREP-based Mission Criticality Codes (IMEC)
In 1977, the Naval Sea Systems Command, NAVSEASYSCOM, and the
Naval Ship Systems Engineering Station Detachment Mechanicsburg,
NAVSSESDETMECH, proposed a new essentiality coding system based upon
historical CASREP data. As noted earlier, a CASREP is a report made by the
Commanding Officer of a unit advising higher echelons of command of equipment
failure and the effect of that failure upon operational readiness. The result of those
proposals was the establishment of the Item Mission Essentiality Code. The IMEC is
an ordinal numeric code, 1 through 4, based upon a mathematic ratio of historic
CASREP severities received over a ten year period. The IMECs were assigned as
follows:
• IMEC 4 assigned if ratio of C3 + C4 to C2 CASREPs is > .2 and ratio of C4 to
C3 CASREPS is > .33.
• IMEC 3 assigned if ratio of C3 + C4 to C2 CASREPs is > .2 and ratio of C4 to
C3 CASREPS is < .33.
• IMEC 2 assigned if ratio of C3 + C4 to C2 CASREPs is < .2.
• IMEC 1 assigned if there are no reported CASREPs.
Known as the Mission Criticality Code, MCC, it is actually a combination of
the EIC level MCC and the component level Mission Essentiality Code, MEC. The
combined code is the Item Mission Essentiality Code, IMEC.
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IMECs were assigned at the Equipment Identification Code, (EIC), level
within ship class. The ship classes used for IMEC assignment grouped ships with
similar systems and performing similar missions. [Ref. 3: p. 4]
For the purposes of this research, I wanted to determine whether the IMEC
codings originally determined were still effective. Based upon the FMSO report
[Ref. 3: Table III] the SPRUANCE class had only twelve IMEC 4 systems on-board of
519 systems. There were 86 IMEC 3 systems. This results in only 18 percent critical
systems, based upon historical CASREPs. The PERRY class ships, newer at the time
of the FMSO report had eight IMEC 4 and 43 IMEC 3 systems out of 147, for 34
percent of total systems. 9 I expected my research to point out that the operation's
personnel view of systems as 'critical' would not be held by the supply system.
IMECs are assigned at the component, APL, level based upon mission impact
in the event of component failure. Such assignments are the responsibility of the
Hardware Systems Command and are based upon the matrix in Figure 3.1. [Ref. 3: p.
C-l] The following definitions are included to understand terms used in Figure 3.1.
• Redundant systems refer to multiple installations of identical systems or
components.
• Alternatives are not identical to the prime unit. They consist of alternative or
emergency systems with the capability of permitting continuous operation of
the system in the event of failure of the prime system. [Ref. 4: Encl. 1, p. 1)
The IMECs for both component and EIC levels figure into the insurance item
computations of the COSAL allowance levels. The second Military Essentiality
Coding system I needed to explore was that applied in the TRIDENT Strategic Missile
Submarine System.
2. The TRIDENT System Military Essentiality Code (MEC)
The Strategic Systems Project Office designed a military essentiality coding
system for the TRIDENT submarine based upon matching the component to system
criticality with the system to mission criticality. The system was defined to be a
ranking system, measuring the effects of parts failures on the capability of the
TRIDENT submarine to perform its mission. Attention was focused, primarily, on the
consequences of system failure on the sub's mission capability. Secondly, the effect of
any single equipment on the parent system was defined.
The EIC is a structured code assigned to identify shipboard systems, subsystems,
and equipments.
















3 4 4 Total loss of
mobility




1 2 3 Severe degradation
of primary mission
1 1 2 Total loss or
severe degradation of
secondary mission
1 1 1 Minor mission
impact
Figure 3.1 Criteria for Manually Assigning IMECs.
There are fourteen separate codes within the TRIDENT MEC system. These
codes are based first, on assigned level of maintenance and, secondly upon individual
item system essentiality. The MEC codes assignable (37, 40, 43, 46, 49, 52, 58, 95, 98,
101, 104, 107, 110 and 116) are broken into two groups [Ref. 5: p. 6]. Those less than
95 are assigned to components with maintenance codes (similar to 3M repair/replace
codes) denoting components which are not repairable or replaceable by ship's force.
Those codes 95 or greater are assigned components which are ship's force capable.
[Ref. 6]
These mission - system - component relationships are determined by a system
of questionnaires completed by the appropriate engineering activity. The
questionnaires construct a system couplet or an equipment couplet, as appropriate.
Figure 3.2 is an example of the method used to determine the couplet applicable to the
system or component. [Ref. 4: Encl 1, p. 5]
The MEC for each system or component is determined by taking the XY
couplets for systems and components into a matrix, Figure 3.3, which assigns one of






SECTION 1 Total Degradation X = 2
Mission Effect Partial Degradation X=l
(If ALL FAIL) Negligible Degradation x=o
SECTION 2 No Altern./ Redund. Y=2
Altera' Redund. Reduced Effectiveness Y=l
(IF ONE FAILS) Equivalent Effectiveness Y =
System couplet = XY =
Figure 3.2 Military Essentiality Questionnaire.
As in the case of the COSAL allowance computation, the MEC plays an
important role in the determination of safety (insurance) stocks for the TRIDENT
system. Details of these two allowance computation models follow immediately.
B. ALLOWANCE MODELS
1. Mod-FLSIP COSAL Allowance Model
COSALs are designed to provide an endurance level of support. Various
allowance models are used to compute these support levels. The Fleet Logistics
Support Improvement Program (FLSIP) model is currently used to compute
allowances on non-Fleet Ballistic Missile ships. A slightly modified replacement model,
the .1 MOD-FLSIP model, is being introduced as ships go through Integrated Logistic
Overhaul (ILO). 10 The following is a discussion, summarized by Figure 3.4, of the
process utilized by the Mod-FLSIP COSAL Allowance Model. [Ref. 7: p. ID3-10]
10 ILOs were formerly known as SOAP, the Supply Overhaul Assistance Program.
During ILO a ship's entire storeroom and issue system is removed, inventoried,
upgraded and begun from scratch with a new COSAL, parts and paperwork.
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SYSTEM | 00 1 01 1 02 I 10 I 11 1 12 1 20 1 21 1 22 1 1
COUPLET 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I-' ' '
| 95 95 95 1 98 1101 1104 1107 1110 1116 1 22 1
| 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1
1 • 95 1 98 1101 1104 1107 1110 1 21 1
| | | I 1 1 1 1
1 95 1 98 1101 1104 1107 I 20 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 95 95 1 98 1101 1104 1 12 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
95 1 98 1101 1 11 1
| 1 1 1 1
I
95 95 1 98 1 10 1
1 1 1
95 1 02 1
1 1
I
95 1 01 1
1 1
I




Figure 3.3 Military Essentiality Code Determination Table.
This model considers only ship's workforce installable items as allowance
candidates. A 90 day demand forecast (\i) is computed for each candidate as follows:
H - (BRF * POP)/
4
Merc, the BRF represents the Best Replacement Factor, an estimate of the
annual usage rate for the part based on fleet-wide usage, and POP is the total part
installed shipboard population across all component applications. Each candidate is
the segmented into one of two categories -- demand based or insurance -- based upon
its expected demand forecast. If the expected demand forecast is one or more units per
quarter, the candidate is classified as a demand based item. Each demand based item is
stocked in sufficient depth to provide 90% protection against stockout. If the expected
demand forecast is less than one unit per quarter, the candidate is classified as an
insurance item. Each insurance item is stocked only if its expected demand forecast is
greater than or equal to a value known as the deep insurance criterion or exclusion
21
criterion. This value is currently set at .025 units per quarter (or .1 units per year).
The Mod-FLSIP model also requires that an insurance item have a vital part to
component IMEC and that the component to mission IMEC be vital, ie. each IMEC
must be 3 or 4. Each insurance item which passes the exclusion criterion is stocked in
a quantity of at least one MRU (Minimum Replacement Unit). Insurance items not
passing the exclusion criteria are not allowed unless there is a Planned Maintenance
Requirement or Technical Override. [Ref. 8: p. B-2]
In sharp contrast to the relative simplicity of the Mod-FLSIP COSAL Model,
the TRIDENT model requires much more detail for understanding. I propose to
present only as much as is necessary to grasp the concepts used in the model for this
research. Much greater detail is contained in Enclosure 1 of Reference 6.
2. The TRIDENT COSAL Model
An immediate difference in philosophy is apparent between the FLSIP model
and the TRIDENT model in that different protection levels are prescribed for parts
based upon their MEC. Whereas only two differentiations are made in the FLSIP
model, six different levels exist for the TRIDENT model [Ref. 6: Encl. 2, p. 1-5]. These
protection levels are shown in Table 1.
Two determination calculations are used in this study. First that for COSAL
quantity:
COSAL QTY = .5 + D + ( 8.8 - 1/6 (116-MEC) - 1.5 LOG 10 P} * D Yz
D = Average Demand P = unit price
The .5 in the formula assures that, after rounding, at least 1 MRU will be
stocked for all items with a MEC > 95. Average demand (D) is a 90 day forecast
based on the BRF and the population. I used the same (|l) figure computed in the
Mod-FLSIP model for the sake of continuity.
The second calculation of which I took note was that for safety level (S):
S = .5 + {8.8 - 1/6 (116-MEC) - 1.5 LOG 10 P} * u
Vz
P = unit price u = average number of failures 11
If MEC = 95 then S = 1.3 * u Vz
11
1 interpreted this to be average demand (D) over the period.
22
Compute Mean



























Figure 3.4 .1 MOD-FLSIP COSAL Model Allowance Quantity Computation.
Source: SPCCINST 4400.30C, 11 FLB 19S2, p. ID3-10
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TABLE 1






107 .99 < t < .999
104 .99
101 .9 < t < .99
98 .9
95 .9
The following paragraphs explain the rationale behind the complex safety
formula. The model assumes demand to be Poisson distributed. Simplification of the
quantity determinations is made by using the Normal approximation of the Poisson:
D = fi + t <i
where
\i = 90 day expected demand
t = Normal standard unit -- measurement of standard deviations
from the mean
(T = standard deviation of demand
Since it was assumed that demand was Poisson distributed, the standard
deviation is equal to the square root of the mean. Therefore the above formula
becomes:
D = n + t n Yz
In fact, it is in this form that allowances for MEC 95 items are calculated with
a t equal to 1.3. The expanded formula, above, is utilized to approximate the greater




CORRELATION OF T VALUE TO PROTECTION LEVEL







The Poisson approximation function for the safety level (S) does not permit
the protection level to be varied depending on the price of the item. The '1.5 LOGjq
P' is an adjustment made to the constants in the Poisson function to take into account
the value (P) of the individual component. [Ref. 6: Encl 2, p. 1-4]
The quantity of spares required in the TRIDENT model is determined to be
Q = D + S.
I determined this to be the allowance quantity, and it was these quantities I compared
against the computations from the Mod-FLSIP model.
My next problem was to determine which systems, uniform to all three Gas-
turbine ship classes, would be used in the study.
C. SAMPLE SYSTEM DETERMINATION
The purpose of this research, as stated at the beginning, was to determine the
feasibility of developing a 'suite' of critical parts uniform to systems within the
engineering area. An additional condition was a minimum of three APLs. I wanted a
mechanical system, an electronic system and a control system. These represented a
broad spectrum of the engineering plant of the gas-turbine ships, based upon my own
experience. My research sponsor, Destroyer Squadron 21 in San Diego, CA,
responded to my request with five different APL numbers, among which was one
system which their engineering personnel considered to be especially critical. These five
systems, (subsystems, really, of the Gas-turbine propulsion plant) are listed in Table 3.
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TABLE 3
SYSTEMS SELECTED FOR RESEARCH
APL Number Short Name
701110382 GTM - Main Fuel Control
701110383 Compressor Inlet Temp Sensor
052050008 GTM - Fuel Manifold Piping
616050177C F.S. Elex Control Torque Computer
616053178C Alfa Circuit Fuel Scheduler
I requested a CASREP report from SPCC for the USS SPRUANCE (DD963).
The makeup of the report requested was for all reported CASREPs over the last five
years for the specified hull. SPRUANCE was selected because she is the oldest ship in
the class. The CASREP report would provide the study with initial information, both
objective and subjective, upon which to base selection of individual components to test.
Additionally, I required CASREP data to determine the MCC, MEC, and IMEC for
allowance computations. As mentioned in Chapter II, I intended to utilize demand
history from 3M reports to compute allowances for the selected APLs, based upon the
IMECs and/or MECs computed from the CASREP reports.
D. SAMPLE COMPONENT DETERMINATION
As mentioned in Section II. E, above, the Navy Maintenance Material
Management (3M) system gathers demand and maintanance information independently
of the supply system. In brief, a non-mechanized ship is required to submit one copy
of the 1250-1 requisition to the 3M system for any parts utilized in a maintenance
action. It is this submission of parts data to the Navy Maintenance Support Office,
(NAMSO), which provides for the accumulation of demand data, over time. The
accuracy of this data will have a decided effect upon the ability of the COSAL model
to adjust for actual demands. This demand data is utilized to update COSAL data
when the ship undergoes an Integrated Logistics Overhaul (ILO).
I requested a NAMSO 4790 Report, Parts Report, from the Navy Sea Logistics
Center, Mechanicsburg. PA. It is this division of NAMSO which maintains the
demand files. The report I requested was for the past ten years demand of all parts
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applicable to the five APLs, for USS SPRUANCE, under research. Ten years of data
was required to allow computations in the Mod-FLSIP COSAL model.
The information received delineated every requisition, by National Item
Identification Number (NUN), as well as summarizing by NUN, within APL. In order
to determine the projected cost of a 'suite' of parts, current unit price data was also
included. In the event I needed to cost out the 'suite', I was prepared to check the
most current Master List/Navy, ML/N.
The final requirement was to query the supply system with respect to availability
of parts in the 'suite'.
E. NAVY SUPPLY SYSTEM PARTS AVAILABILITY
The Navy Ship's Parts Control Center, SPCC, maintains stock visibility on all
Navy managed stocks of ship repair parts. Those NTINs with COGs 9- or 5- are part
or the Navy Retail Supply System and are managed by DLA, GSA or other Armed
Services. For those NTINs, individual stock points maintain visibility of their own
inventories. For the purpose of this study, I intended to query NSC San Diego and
NSC Oakland for inventory status of 'suite' parts.
F. VISIBILITY METHODOLOGY
The original question posed by DESRON 21 alluded to the packup kits common
in the aviation community. These are aggregations of parts, insurance items, demand
items and those required for preventative maintenance which might be required by the
embarked aviation detachment during the projected period of operations. In the case
of the packup kits utilized by the anti-submarine helicopter detachments which might
be embarked in a gas-turbine warship, visibility of the inventory is maintained by the
Naval Air Station (NAS) supply department to which the detachment is attached when
not embarked. Requisitions for replenishments of line items drawn from these packups
are forwarded to and filled from the stocks of that NAS. Since no like symbiotic
relationship exists between the Gas-turbine ships and an NSC, a discussion of how, or
if, visibility of a 'suite' of parts was required and will be undertaken in Chapter V.
G. COMMENTS ON THE RESEARCH BACKGROUND
The supply system components investigated, allowance calculation, material
essentiality computation, and CASREP and demand reporting are all well documented,
functional subsystems of the infinitely more complex Navy Supply System. There are
well-intentioned and well thought out interrelationships which are intended to provide
27
cross-referencing and cross-checks on the millions of transactions occurring annually. I
expected to find, as my research began, a simple progression of data which would allow
me to make a judgement on a ship class level of the effectiveness of one allowance
computation method against another. I expected the subsystem components
mentioned above to provide the study with the data, interrelated as intended. I did not




Recall that the purpose of this research was to determine the feasibility of
providing improved supply support to specific systems. The plan was to specify a
methodology by which to explore the model currently in use and to compare it with an
alternative model, proceeding in a fashion which approximated the prescribed
procedures for determining onboard allowances. The following sections will,
sequentially, deal with the essentiality question, the COSAL allowance computations,
comparisons thereof and finally, the issue of any subjective elements to the problem.
A. MISSION ESSENTIALITY CODE DETERMINATION
A Caveat. The IMECs and MECs determined in this study are not necessarily
those which would be determined by the respective hardware systems commands, but
do represent a faithful test against the criteria laid down by the Strategic Systems
Program Office for the TRIDENT system and the Naval Sea Systems Command for
normal surface ship systems.
I determined an Item Mission Essentiality Code for each of the selected APLs by
entering redundancy and mission criticality assumptions about each into the MEC
selection matrix previously displayed as Figure 3.1. Table 4 below displays the results
of that determination.
TABLE 4








It was noted in Chapter III.A.l, that relatively low MEC assignments were made
to what might otherwise be considered essential systems. This was not unexpected,
given the redundancies and alternatives built into the Gas-turbine class vessels. (See
Chapter III, section A.l.) However, it did impact on what parts would automatically
be allowed by the Mod-FLSIP COSAL model. Components of systems with low (2 or
1) MECs were not allowed as insurance items unless so designated by Technical
Overrides, while high MEC systems allowed far more insurance items as a consequence
of the model. This difference in allowance criteria was indicated in Figure 3.4.
Additionally, there is no room in the IMEC calculation for subjectivity on the
part of the supply system. The code determination is completely determined by the
number of CASREPs reported, over time. In the case of the data used in this effort,
two APLs reported no CASREPS over the period of study. 12 Regardless of criticality,
the system prescribed will assign an IMEC of I. In this case, APL 616050177C, the
Free Standing Electronic Control Torque Converter, has an onboard population of
only one. The engineering personnel in the squadron consider it to be an essential and
undersupported system. However, it has no reported CASREPS and, therefore, an
IMEC of 1. No such impediment to establishing a relevant essentiality was apparent
in the TRIDENT coding system.
Each of the components listed in the demand history reports from NAMSO was
subjected to the selection criteria laid out in Figure 3.3, both from a system and a
component criteria. Table 5 summarizes the distribution of MECs determined for the
sample of components in this research effort. 13
It is apparent that no MEC of 104 was assigned. An explanation of this
phenomenon is found in the requirements for a 104 MEC. For the one system with a
system couplet of 22 to have any parts with a 104, it would have been necessary for the
failure of a part with no redundancy or alternatives to have resulted in just a partial
degradation. For the other systems, each assigned a system couplet of 21, a 104 MEC
would require redundancy or alternatives, but total degradation if all failed. These two
situations did not occur in the data obtained from the demand history. There was no
significance in the lack of any 104 MECs. Note should be taken that the only 116
MECs occurred where the one system with a 22 couplet also had components with 22
couplets. The TRIDENT system is very stingy with its highest MEC.
See Appendix C for a listing of the CASREP information utilized in this study.
A complete listing of MEC couplets and assignments is included in the
TRIDENT COSAL Allowance Determinations, Appendix B.
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TABLE 5
TRIDENT COMPONENT APL MECS
MEC
95 98 101 104 107 110 116 TOTAL
APL
052050008 8 13 21 6 39 87
616050177C 2 2
701110382 1 3 8 5 17
701110383 3 1 4
616053178C No Demand E istory
Having established a baseline of mission essentiality codes for the sample
components and APLs, the next item to pursue was the calculation of independent
COSAL allowances from the two selected models, the in-use Mod-FLSIP model and
the TRIDENT COSAL model.
B. COSAL ALLOWANCE CALCULATIONS
1
. The Data and the Calculations
110 individual components were provided by the Demand History report
obtained from NAM SO. No data was reported for one of the APLs. Only 1 APL
provided a significant amount, 87 line items, of data. One other provided 17 line items.
Since these were the APLs provided by the original sponsor of the research, I decided
to restrict the modeling to them, even though the data was sparse. The main reason
for the decision was that there was, obviously, a perception of a lack of support for
these APLs. Therefore, the question of possibly improving support for them still held,
and, in fact, the paucity of data was, itself, a part of both the answer and the
conclusions drawn therefrom. This aspect will be dealt with in Chapter V.
Calculations were performed on an Apple HE microcomputer, utilizing the
APPLEWORKS integrated spreadsheet. Sample calculations were manually performed
to check the accuracy of the computerized models. Complete listings of the
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calculations and subsequently obtained allowances are displayed in Appendix A, for
the Mod-FLSIP COSAL model, and Appendix B, for the TRIDENT COSAL
allowance computations.
A Caveat. As with the IMEC and MEC determinations in the previous
section, the allowance calculations made within the scope of this research may not be
those determined by the respective hardware systems commands. Original MEC
determinations were made on engineering estimates. The MECs utilized in this project
were calculated utilizing the prescribed formulae, as directed by the appropriately noted
references.
2. Performance of the Models
The most important result obtained from the Mod-FLSIP calculations was
that every single line item in the demand history was allowed as either demand based or
an insurance item. The models functioned exactly as designed, designating few demand
based allowances, yet providing safety levels of support.
Specifically, in the case of APL 052050008, 8 of 87 components listed, 9.1%,
were calculated to be allowed as demand items. All of these components were items,
such as gaskets or packing, which were determined to be Preventative Maintenance
System (PMS) items.
Also of significant note was that no 7H cognizance Depot Level Repairables
(DLR) were picked up as demand items. Three of the APLs are very dependent upon
printed circuit systems. Within the body of the sample data, 11 line items, 10%, were
7H, (or 2H), yet none were in the 9% selected as demand based. This was attributed
to the predominance of PMS items in the demand based selections and to apparent
reliability of system components.
Application of the TRIDENT COSAL model took place in two parts. First,
application was made without modifying the vastly superior protection levels provided
by this model. This was done because of the premise provided by the thesis purpose,
improved support. Obviously, this improved level of performance would entail
additional inventory cost. Secondly, the model was reapplied with protection levels
approximating those of the Mod-FLSIP model, 85%.
The TRIDENT model differs in operation in that it computes a single
allowance, rather than differentiating, specifically, between demand based and
insurance. This single allowance can be broken into its demand and insurance
quantities, as noted in 1 1 LB. 2, above. A complete listing of the computed allowances,
in their component parts is provided in Appendix B.
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In almost all instances, the safety quantity exceeded the demand quantity-
computed, a product of the safety level computation. Specifically, only those NIINs
with a computed MEC of 95 provided for demand levels in excess of the safety level.
This is indicative of the significantly increased protection levels provided by the MECs
greater than 95.
The effect of the price moderator noted above was evident in the quantities
allowed. One specific example of the moderator effect is shown in Table 6.
TABLE 6
TRIDENT PRICE MODERATOR EFFECT
MIX PRICE MEC p. DEMAND SAFETY ALLOW
00-118-3177 S.14 101 .1 .4 2.6 3
00-118-3177 S14.00 101 .1 .4 1.6 2
00-118-3177 S 140.00 101 .1 .4 1.1 2
While a price increase does not necessarily- elicit a decrease in safety level of
the same relative magnitude, the moderator effect is obvious. Another effect on the
safety level was that caused by the lessening of the protection levels in the second
iteration of the TRIDENT model.
The model formulae were modified to provide for each NUN to have a forced
MEC of 95. Additionally, the safety level formula was changed to:
S = 1.04 *u'
/2
The change from 1.30 in the original formula for a part with a MEC of 95 to
1.04 reflects the change from 90% to 85% protection, (a Normal Z value), thus
simulating the Mod-FLSIP levels.
The results of this recomputation were two-fold. First, 64% of all allowances
were reduced by approximately 20%. Only 31 of the allowances did not change as a
result of the lowered protection levels. These were those which already had MECs of
95 or 98, or were accounted for by the rounding process.
The second result was that of a reversal of weight within the allowances
themselves. By shifting the burden of protection away from the safety level, a much
33
greater emphasis was placed on demand in the computations. The result was higher
demand levels and concurrently lowered safety levels. This shift was evident even in
the NIINs which did not change allowances overall.
To briefly summarize the results of the respective allowance computations, the
TRIDENT model showed much more propensity to take into account price and
protection level within its calculations, even when the TRIDENT-inflated protection
levels were deflated to a normal 85%. It remained to compare the two separate
computations with a view toward answering research questions 1 and 2.
C. COMPARING THE MODELS
In the first instance, with the TRIDENT model running unrestricted, support
was more than doubled for most line items over that provided by the Mod-FLSIP
model. Even those with MEC of 95, approximating a 90% protection level, doubled
the support of the Mod-FLSIP model.
In the second iteration of the TRIDENT model, that approximating the same
protection levels as the Mod-FLSIP model, support still remained higher (data not
included). Even though there was a significant lowering of allowances, the TRIDENT
model still provided at least twice the depth of the Mod-FLSIP computations.
Conclusions drawn from the above data will be enumerated in the next chapter,
however, certain significant items are summarized below as a baseline for those
conclusions and subsequent recommendations.
• CASREP history shows either good support or good reliability for the APLs
selected.
• Demand history shows relatively light demand for components of the 'critical'
APLs.
• The Mod-FLSIP model will provide, at ILO, an allowance for every single A7//V
reported.
• The TRIDENT model provides at least double the support, even at the same
protection level.
One final fact of great importance in later discussions of subjective elements in
the models is that the only NIINs common to both CASREP reports and the Demand
History reports are those which are already allowed in the ship's COSAL. All other
NIINs required by the CASREPs, those not currently allowed in the ship's COSAL, do
not appear in the demand history.
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V. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS
This chapter presents conclusions drawn as a result of the research effort. The
conclusions will be related to the specific research questions posed and. ultimately, to
the purpose of this research, the feasibility of determining and establishing a 'suite' of
repair parts for critical engineering equipment. To facilitate establishing these
relationships, a restatement of the original research questions may be helpful.
• Do current COSAL allowance models provide carried status for the 'most-
likely-to-fail' critical parts?
• If an alternate model were used would it provide greater range of critical parts?
• Do any such parts exist in current Navy owned inventories in sufficient
numbers to support an in-theater' repair parts 'suite'?
• How should visibility on such parts be maintained?
• Are there subjective elements of the model which effect its ability to meet its
objective effectiveness goals?
A. QUESTION 1 » COSAL SUPPORT
With respect to question 1, that of the sufficiency of the current model in
supporting 'most-likely-to-fail parts', I must conclude that the .1 Mod-FLSIP COSAL
model currently in use does meet requirements. The following is offered in support of
that conclusion.
• Based upon the data obtained, every part with historical demand over the last
ten years was selected for allowance. The selection may have been as demand-
based or a one or two MRU insurance item, but the fact remains that the
COSAL model did allow stockage.
• Within the classes of ship studied, redundancy and alternative solutions are
sufficient to further reduce the criticality of systems, with respect to a 'mission-
crippling' casualty. Only one of the APLs submitted for research was not
protected by a duplicate or redundant system which would allow mission
continuance.
• Reliability of the systems submitted for study appears to be high. The
historical demand file lists very few parts required for maintenance actions. The
Total column of Table 5, lists the number of NTINs by APL. The average
number of NTINs required per year ranged from .2 to 1.7. The exception, APL
052050008. requisitioned an average of 8.7 NTINs per year. This led to one of
two possible conclusions: First, that the systems were reliable or; second, that
demand data was not being submitted to the 3M system. This latter possibility
will arise again, with respect to question 5.
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• I concluded, based upon the data available, that the systems were well-
supported by the onboard allowance. Appendix C displays the low number of
CASREPs reported.
B. QUESTION 2 -- ALTERNATE MODEL IMPROVEMENT
Given that the model in use apparently provides sufficient support, the question
of improved range from an alternative model appears moot. However, the following
conclusions are offered for completeness:
• No improvements in range were made in the limited application of an
alternative model, the TRIDENT COSAL model, to the data in hand. The
data displayed in Appendices A and B support this conclusion.
• The apparent improvements in depth offer no improvements in support for the
systems under study. Even when the protection levels were reduced to a
comparable 85%, depth was still doubled on most NIINs.
A final summary conclusion may be drawn:
Given that, by virtue of being demanded, every NUN demanded then qualifies for
an allowance under the current model, no arithmetic method can be determined, based
upon demand or CASREP-based criticality, which can justify a 'suite' of parts.
Therefore, it is infeasible to determine, at least statistically, a 'suite' of repair parts. 14
C. QUESTION 3 -- INVENTORY AVAILABILITY
I drew two conclusions with respect to inventory availability. The first was the
question of parts being available in the wholesale system. Since no additional parts
could be defined as a 'suite' no query of system resources was possible.
Second was the question of onboard stockage. Ten of the twenty NIINs
reported by CASREP were not-carried items, (see Appendix C). Thus, we may
conclude that onboard inventories and allowances are insufficient to preclude
casualties. However, the significance of no reported demands for not-carried CASREP
demands being reflected in the demand history, cannot go unnoticed with respect to
The U.S. Navy Supply Corps ethic tends to be that to say 'No!' to a request
without offering an alternative means to the desired end is to admit failure, a lack of
innovative thought and no initiative. As a result of the research, I determined that a
specific model could be applied to any selected list of NIINs to determine if they would
be individually worth earning and, en masse, worth the effort, overall. This model is
discussed in Appendix D, as an alternative. It is a 'quick and dirty' model for
determining which NIINs might qualify for technical overrides, based upon
'maintenance feel', mission essentiality and cost. Because of the vague nature of these
elements, I do not recommend use of this-model without further study.
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this question. This apparent failure of the demand reporting system is the subject of
conclusions to question 5.
D. QUESTION 4 -- SUITE' VISIBILITY
In the introduction to the idea of a 'suite' of parts, the 'pack-up kits' utilized by
the aviation community and the relationship between the squadron and the NAS was
discussed. It was noted, at that time, that no such relationship existed between ships
and their stock points.
Theoretically, there are various alternatives to the question of maintaining system
visibility on any 'suite' of parts designed to serve the purpose of this research.
• The 'suite' may be maintained in the Navy Stock Fund, with the visibility of
any other line item managed by an Inventory Manager.
• The 'suite' may be drawn, as end-use, by the Type Commander concerned. As
such, visibility would no longer be available to the system, as a whole, but
rather to the Type Commander.
• The 'suite' may be drawn, and maintained, by select hulls within the squadron.
Visibility is lost, except by report to the squadron and/ or Type Commander.
Such a 'suite' allowance would have to be authorized by technical override.
The first alternative is unacceptable. There is no current mechanism for
maintaining visibility of NIINs on any platform other than those carrying Special
Accounting Class (SAC) 207 or 230 Navy Stock Fund Inventories. These ships, AFS,
AO, AE, AOE, etc., have Navy established mechanisms by which visibility of the
stocks carried is maintained, at least quarterly, the the Navy Supply System. To
modify any such system for a 'suite' of only a relative few parts is not feasible, nor is it
cost effective.
The third alternative is equally unacceptable. Since the current COSAL model
allows stockage of those NIINs determined most likely to be needed, removing other
NIINs from visibility, on an individual platform basis, is equally cost ineffective.
In the event that any such 'suite' is devised, (utilizing the alternative prescribed in
Appendix D or any other method.) I conclude that only the Type Commander should
fund and maintain visibility of such 'suites'. In brief, if a casualty on any platform in
company with such a 'suite' should occasion an issue of a NUN from the 'suite' than
the Type Commander should requisition a replacement part. Such activity should be
part of the CASREP process to assure a record of significant maintenance and
sufficiently visible to assure that usage be recorded against the demand history in the
3M files. It is this final recommendation for demand visibility which leads to the
conclusions to question 5.
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E. QUESTION 5 - SUBJECTIVE EFFECTS ON THE MODEL
It was surprising to note during the modelling effort that no 'not-carried' NIINs
reported in CASREPs were recorded in the demand history. To any experienced
Supply Officer, this leads to only one conclusion:
• CASREP demands are not being reported to the 3M system, in accordance with
the standard operating procedures for requisitioning parts required for
maintenance actions.
Within the body of those procedures is a requirement to submit a copy of the
original requisition to the 3M system. It appears that the high visibility and the
pressure for speed of a CASREP requisition can result neglecting to complete the
requisition loop prescribed. In brief, the Supply Officer, or one of his senior personnel,
normally handles a CASREP. The requisition is handled in an 'off-line' fashion and is
either phoned or submitted in non-MILSTRIP message format directly to the
Inventory Control Point. It appears that only the obligation and outstanding
requisition file copy of the original document are retained, since these documents are
traceable, while the 3M document is not.
The end result of this omission is that demands for critical parts, those required
for casualty corrective maintenance, but which are not allowed, are never reported to
3M and are, therefore, never a part of any recomputation of COSAL allowances.
Therefore, any judgement of the effectiveness of the COSAL model in meeting
demands for 'critical' parts is severely hampered by the significant failure of prescribed
administrative procedures to properly record critical demands where the system might act
upon them, as it is designed to do.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY
The original purpose of this research was to determine the feasibility of designing
a 'suite' o[ critical engineering parts to be carried in company with a group of gas-
turbine ships. These parts were to be those which were not eligible for a COSAL
allowance and, yet. were considered to be critical to the preclusion of a mission-
threatening casualty. The fact that the engineering plants of three complete classes of
gas-turbine ships are uniform lent a certain reasonableness to the proposal.
To determine this feasibility, I have investigated the current COSAL model to
determine the characteristics required to qualify for an allowance. I have investigated
an alternative model which relies more upon the criticality of a part than upon its
historical demand to determine allowability. During the investigation, and subsequent
testing of data against both models, I discovered that the current model will, at the
next ILO, provide adequate COSAL coverage for any component which has
established a historical demand. Additionally, I discovered that the ability of the
model to perform adequately has been hampered by a failure in administrative
procedures. As a result, I make the following recommendations.
A. RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1 -- CAS REP histories for the APLs selected as critical be
requested for all concerned ships. Additionally, Demand Histories for selected APLs,
cross-referenced to all concerned ships, should be requested. A cross-reference effort
should be undertaken to:
• identify NTINs required for CASREP correction, the demands for which do not
appear in the history,
• identify not-carried NTINs which might be considered for any subsequent
technical override allowance, and
• determine whether proposed 'critical' APLs display any history of failure
attributed to component failure.
Even though, as shown, the current model provides for the allowance of a
sufficient range of parts, there occurs a timing issue. The period of time between the
model establishing an item as allowable and the ILO during which the part might
actually be allowed may be years. As a temporary action, the following
recommendation is offered.
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Recommendation 2 - Pending ILO update of the COSAL allowances, the Type
Commander should consider for 'suite' inclusion any Not Allowed part demanded for
selected critical systems by ships in the classes concerned.
Recommendation 3 - SPCC and NAMSO should undertake an effort to
determine the feasibility of a data link to ensure that, in the future, demand data for
CASREP requisitions is entered into the Maintenance Data Collection System files.
No demands made upon the system are so critical to future allowance decisions as
those which were required to correct a casualty.
Recommendation 4 — A significant effort should be undertaken to determine an
average cost for a ship which is unable to perform its mission due to a casualty. Some
of the questions involved are:
• Is the cost different for different classes of ships?
• Does the cost vary by mission?
• How many of the identifiable costs are fixed, and thereby excluded from
consideration?
• What costs should be included, and how far up the supply/logistics chain
should they reach?
Recommendation 5 -- A statistically valid survey of ships and APLs for the entire
fleet should be undertaken to determine the extent to which CASREP demands fail to
be recorded in the MDCS system. Such a survey could reveal a significant failure
within the system, the result of which might be significant allowance shortfalls of
critical parts.
B. SUMMARY
Determining the correct depth and range of parts to carry onboard any Navy
vessel is a problem of herculean proportions. Years of effort on the part of Navy
logisticians at all levels have resulted in the models investigated herein, as well as many
others in use. The failure of a ship to meet a mission commitment because a part is
not carried is unavoidable, but the probabilities can be decreased by following proper
procedures. It was the purpose of this research to determine, in one small area, if
additional protection could be afforded a specific class of ships.
The research showed that the Mod-FLSIP COSAL allowance model provided
sufficient range to protect the APLs submitted for test, but that not all demands were
being recorded. Prior to the implementation of the n = .1 parameter, several of the
components would have been excluded which are now allowed. As a result, I
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concluded that no reasonable method existed to provided, based upon available usage
or cnticality data, a 'suite' of repair parts.
I recommended that additional research be undertaken to further define the costs
of casualties, and to determine those NIINs which have shown themselves to require
an allowance, but which, through administrative error, have not yet qualified.
Attempting to second-guess the reliability o[ the highly complex and very
technical systems which make up the engineering plants of^ the gas-turbine ships will be
frustrating, costly and fraught with human error. I believe it is best to remain with the
statistically proven, if not always correct, models which provide for spare parts
allowances. Based upon historical demand and engineering estimates, these models
stock our storerooms and keep our ships at a high state of readiness within the
confines of limited resources and ever-tightening budget constraints.
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1 .1 .1 1
1 1 .1 .1 1
1 $774.00 1 .1 .1 1
1 $499.00 1 .1 .1 1
1 $1,130.00 1 .1 .1 1
1 $99.00 1 .1 .1 1
4 $44.00 4 .4 .4 4
2 $12.00 1 .2 .2 1
1 $997.00 1 .1 .1 1
15 $.73 10 1.5 1.5 3
4 $.76 2 .4 .4 2
5 $7.30 4 .5 .5 8
1 $123.00 1 .1 .1 1
1 $.25 1 .1 .1 1
2 $12.00 1 .2 .2 1
1 $22.00 1 .1 .1 1
1 $3.50 1 .1 .1 1
1 $18.50 1 .1 .1 1
1 $21.35 1 .1 .1 1
1 $13.20 1 .1 .1 1
2 $1.19 2 .2 .2 2
18 $4.01 2 1.8 1.8 4
1 $8.50 1 .1 .1 1
1 $59.00 1 .1 .1 1
3 $14.03 1 .3 .3 1
6 $.67 3 .6 .6 6
1 $1.93 1 .1 .1 1
2 $1.68 2 .2 .2 2
3 $.10 1 .3 .3 1
4 $.59 1 .4 .4 1
1 $9.44 1 .1 .1 1
2 $8.37 2 .2 .2 2
4 $459.00 4 .4 .4 4
3 $1.17 1 .3 .3 1
1 $1.34 1 .1 .1 1
5 $16.00 5 .5 .5 10
5 $18.50 5 .5 .5 10
9 $325.00 3 .9 .9 6
1 $.05 1 .1 .1 1
4 $229.00 4 .4 .4 4
10 $13.97 10 .4 .4 10





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APL:616050177C POP: 1 MIL
.
ESSENT. ALLOWANCES






















































































































































































APL:701110383 POP: 4 MIL. ESSENT. ALLOWANCES
COG MI IN QTY MU COUPLETS MEC (1) (2) (3)
9V 00-118-3177 1 .1 21 21 107 3 2.9 .4
7H 00-601-1236 1 .1 21 22 110 1 1.0 .4
9G 01-005-8617 1 .1 21 21 107 2 1.3 .4
9V 00-821-3889 1 .1 21 21 107 3 2.3 .4
NOTES: (1) Total COSAL Allowance Rounded to
nearest whole number
'2) Safety Level
3) Computed Demand Quantity
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APPENDIX C



















































































Unusual Demand. 4 allowed 7H DLR, onboard,
26 requisitioned.
Unusual Demand. 4 allowed, 4 onboard, 30 required.




The overriding factor in these alternative models is the requirement that a
Technical Override be utilized to cause any NIINs which meet the following criteria to
be requisitioned. The only other alternative is for the Type Commander to order them.
Any NIINs selected must be determined by engineering personnel based upon
'maintenance feel'. There is no way the supply system can be used to point to those
parts which might be needed. I believe that I have shown, in the body of this thesis,
that the system, as currently designed, works.
I developed two different methods of determining cost effectiveness of a suite' of
parts. The first is the individual value of a NUN against the probability of a casualty
in the system.
The operation of the TRIDENT COSAL model depends upon material
essentiality relationships rather than demand history for the determination of a safety
level. I experimented with changes in the Z (normalized multiplier) value while
attempting to simulate the same protection levels as the Mod-FLSIP model. I also
demonstrated the effect of the price modifier (1.5 LOG p) in Table 6.
It was during this experimentation that I discovered a significant relationship
between the safety level (S) and the price modifier. By setting S constant at .5 units,
the minimum at which rounding would cause one MRU to be stocked, and solving for
LOG P, I could determine the maximum price at which the desired protection level for
any specified MEC would be obtained. The resulting formula for this price
determination is:
(8.8 - 1/6(1 16- MEC)- 1.5 x} * D Yl = .5
where
x = Log P and D = .01
I set D at .01 as the minimum required failure rate for the model to assure a
protection level of 99.9% against any failure at all over a ten year period. In other
words. I desired to model for .1 failures in ten years, that meaning the system would be
covered for 99.9% of that period.
Using the MEC as a variable forced a different value for LOG P for each MEC
value. The values computed are shown in Table 7 below.
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TABLE 7









Thus, any selected NUN, the price of which does not exceed that associated with
the MEC assigned it by the XY couplet method in Figure 3.2 might be presumed to
have a value greater on board than the potential cost of an associated failure. This
presumption is tenuous at best, but is a point from which the cost effectiveness of a
'suite' of critical parts might be begun.
For systems with established \i values based upon actual failure data, the dollar
value will increase markedly. In fact, for a ]i of .1, the formula allows a maximum
value for MEC 95 of S300. Such recomputation of Log P values is left to the
interested reader.
The second method determines the overall value of any 'suite' of parts based
upon the cost to the Navy of a ship with a mission-threatening failure. The major
failing of this method is the need for a finite cost of such a failure. For the purposes of
demonstration, I utilized the following:
• A delay of 5 days pending arrival of parts.
• A cost of S50,000 per day for a ship to be unable to meet its mission objectives.
• A S2000 transportation cost to deliver required parts.
The total cost of a single failure with the above parameters is $232,000. I next
assigned the 5 APLs utilized in the research the associated failure rates (X). I
computed X by dividing the number of C3,C4 CASREPs by 10. By multiplying each X
with the total value and summing those products, I reached a total projected cost of
failure per year. The example described above is shown in Table 8.
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TABLE 8
TOTAL CASUALTY COST CALCULATION
APL X Exp. Value
052050008 .1 S25200
701 1103S2 .1 S25200




If the projected price of the suite' of parts is less than the total projected cost of
casualties. (SS0.640), its value might be construed to be greater to the vessel than its
cost. This presumption is also tenuous but, again, provides a starting place for
determination of a suite' of critical parts.
A case might be made for combining the first and second methods to determine
the maximum number o[ line items to be carried. I attempted this utilizing the
percentage of each MEC in the sample data. The relationship can be made, but the
number of line items is in excess of 20,000. Even using a |i of .1 in the calculations,
the number of line items was still 110. While the relationship exists, it is not
reasonable to mate the two in any realistic sense.
I have displayed these two methods of determining some cost effectiveness to
show a possible relationship between failure rates and price. I do not recommend their




1. U.S. Naval Supply Systems Command, NAVSUP PUB 533, Inventory
Management.
2. Solomon, H., A Method for Determining the Military Worth of Spare Parts,
Logistics Research Project, Serial T-82,'58, George Washington University, April
1958.
3. Navy Fleet Material Support Office, Report 143, CASREP-Based Mission
Criticality Codes, August 1981.
4. Strategic Systems Project OfFice Instruction 4423.66, Determination of TRIDENT
System Military Essentiality Codes, 31 May 1984.
5. Navy Fleet Material Support OfFice, Mechanicsburg, PA Report 93, TRIDENT
COSAL: Refit Facility Supply Support Requirements, December 1972.
6. Strategic Systems Program OfFice Instruction 4423. 27B, Procedures for the
Determination of Repair Parts Support Requirements for Fleet Ballistic Missile
Weapon System and TRIDENT Strategic Weapon System Equipments, 9 July
1974.
7. Navy Ships Parts Control Center Instruction 4400. 30C, Exploder Provisioning
Manual, 11 February 1982.
8. Navy Fleet Material Support OfFice, Mechanicsburg PA, Report 129, Trident
Cosal Study, March 1977.
52
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bouchard, Joe, LCDR, USN, Destroyer Squadron Twenty-one, San Diego, CA,
Interview. 15 August 19S7.
Department of the Navy, Center for Naval Analyses, Shipboard Parts Allowance Policy,
CNR 12,(1981).
Department of the Navy, Navy Fleet Material Support Office, Evaluation of the C.XA
Recommended COSAL Model, Report 144, (1981).
Department of the Navy, Navy Fleet Material Support Office, Evaluation of the MCO
COSAL Policy. Report 161, (1985).
Department of the Navy, Navy Fleet Material Support Office, Upper Limits of COSAL
Performance, Report 145, (1981).
Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Research, The Polaris Military Essentiality
System, Report Serial T-171, (1964).
Department of the Navy, Naval Supply Systems Command, Publication 485, Afloat
Supply Procedures.
Metalavage, Joseph A., A Review of Shipboard Allowance Computation and the Use of





1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
3. Professor D. R. Whipple, Code 54 5
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
4. CDR J. F. McClain, SC, USN, Code 54MC 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
5. LCDR K. W. Bogott, SC, USN 3
USS SAN DIEGO (AFS 6)
FPO New York, NY 09587
6. Professor Alan McMasters, Code 54MG 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
7. Professor Thomas Moore, Code 54MR 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
8. LCDR Joe Bouchard 2
Destroyer Squadron 21
FPO San Francisco, CA 96601-4720
9. Defense Logitics Studies Information Exchange 1
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center
Fort Lee, VA 23801
10. LCDR R. L. Gilson, SC, USN, Code 0412 1












feasibility of a special-
ized allowance of criti-







feasibility of a special"
ized allowance of criti-
cal spare parts for gas-
turbine class ships.
Sf«T*£

